Understanding, treating, and renaming grandiose delusions : a qualitative study by Isham, L. et al.
This is a repository copy of Understanding, treating, and renaming grandiose delusions : a
qualitative study.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/154961/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Isham, L., Griffith, L., Boylan, A. et al. (6 more authors) (2019) Understanding, treating, 
and renaming grandiose delusions : a qualitative study. Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research and Practice. papt.12260. ISSN 1476-0835 
https://doi.org/10.1111/papt.12260
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice (2019)
© 2019 The Authors. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice
published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society
www.wileyonlinelibrary.com
Understanding, treating, and renaming grandiose
delusions: A qualitative study
Louise Isham1,2* , Laura Griffith3 , Anne-Marie Boylan4 ,
Alice Hicks5,6, Natalie Wilson5,6, Rory Byrne7 ,
Bryony Sheaves1,2 , Richard P. Bentall8 and Daniel Freeman1,2
1Oxford Cognitive Approaches to Psychosis (O-CAP), Department of Psychiatry,
University of Oxford, UK
2Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust, UK
3Health Services Management Centre, University of Birmingham, UK
4Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, University of Oxford, UK
5Patient Advisory Group, Oxford Cognitive Approaches to Psychosis (O-CAP),
Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, UK
6The McPin Foundation, London, UK
7Psychosis Research Unit, GreaterManchesterMental HealthNHS Foundation Trust,
UK
8Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, UK
Background. Grandiose delusions are arguably the most neglected psychotic experi-
ence in research.
Objectives. We aimed to discover from patients: whether grandiose delusions have
harmful consequences; the psychological mechanisms that maintain them; and what help
patients may want from clinical services.
Design. A qualitative interview design was used to explore patients’ experiences of
grandiose delusions.
Method. Fifteen patients with past or present experiences of grandiose delusions who
were attending psychiatric services were interviewed. Thematic analysis and grounded
theory were used to analyse the data.
Results. Participants reported physical, sexual, social, occupational, and emotional
harms from grandiose delusions. All patients described the grandiose belief as highly
meaningful: it provided a sense of purpose, belonging, or self-identity, or it made sense of
unusual or difficult events. The meaning from the belief was not synonymous with
extreme superiority or arrogance. The meaning obtained appeared to be a key driver of
the persistence of the beliefs. Other maintenance factors were subjectively anomalous
experiences (e.g., voices), symptoms of mania, fantasy elaboration, reasoning biases, and
immersive behaviours. Participants described insufficient opportunities to talk about their
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grandiose beliefs and related experiences andwere generally positive about the possibility
of a psychological therapy.
Conclusions. We conclude that grandiosity is a psychologically rich experience, with a
number of maintenance factors that may be amenable to a targeted psychological
intervention. Importantly, the term ‘grandiose delusion’ is an imprecise description of the
experience; we suggest ‘delusions of exceptionality’ may be a credible alternative.
Practitioner points
 Harm from grandiose delusions can occur across multiple domains (including physical, sexual, social,
occupational, and emotional) and practitioners should assess accordingly.
 However, grandiose delusions are experienced by patients as highlymeaningful: they provide a sense of
purpose, belonging, or self-identity, or make sense of unusual or difficult events.
 Possible psychological maintenance mechanisms that could be a target for intervention include the
meaning of the belief, anomalous experiences, mania, fantasy elaboration, reasoning biases, and
immersive behaviours.
 Patients are keen to have the opportunity to access talking therapies for this experience. Taking extra
time to talk at times of distress, ‘going the extra mile’, and listening carefully can help to facilitate trust.
Grandiose delusions are unfounded beliefs that one has special powers, wealth, mission,
or identity (Leff, Fischer, & Bertelsen, 1976). Despite being a common type of delusion
(Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 1999; Goodwin& Jamison, 2007) – occurring in about half
of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and two thirds of patients with bipolar disorder
(Knowles, McCarthy-Jones, & Rowse, 2011) – they have been remarkably neglected as a
specific focus of research and clinical practice. Indeed, although theoretical discussions
about grandiose beliefs date back more than 100 years (Bleuler, 1950; Freud, 1911), very
little in theway of empirical research has been conducted (Knowles et al., 2011), and only
a handful of studies test hypotheses regarding causal or maintenance mechanisms. This
dearth of research activity is particularly apparent when compared to the extensive
literature focusing on other psychotic experiences such as persecutory delusions and
auditory hallucinations.
This apparent disparity may have arisen for several reasons. There may be a perception
that grandiose delusions represent a more benign presentation in non-affective psychosis
and that they will not be distressing or harmful given the focus of the belief. Alternatively,
theymay be viewed simply as a symptomofmania in affective psychosis, and therefore, it is
presumed that research and clinical focus should be on the manic episode rather than the
belief per se. These assumptions, however, may be erroneous. Both harm and distress can
occurwith grandiose delusions (e.g., believing one is invincible and stepping into traffic, or
believing one is Jesus and will therefore be crucified). Potential maintenance mechanisms
(e.g., reasoning biases) beyond mania have been identified (Bortolon, Yazbek, Norton,
Capdevielle, & Raffard, 2019; Garety et al., 2012) and others hypothesized (Knowles et al.,
2011). Furthermore, factor analytic symptom studies and twin design genetic studies
suggest that there are distinct aetiological influences for different psychotic experiences,
including grandiosity (Ronald et al., 2014; Zavos et al., 2014), and there is therefore a
rationale for the development of experience-specific models and intervention (Freeman,
2016). Our view is that grandiose delusions require specific research scrutiny.
Our aim was to further understanding directly from patients. Three key areas were
examined: the harmful consequences of grandiose delusions, why the beliefs persist, and
what patients may want from services. The rationale to intervene is inextricably linked to
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whether grandiose delusions cause harm, and therefore, we wanted to detail the types of
harmful consequences that may occur. If intervention is indicated, then the mechanisms
to target to effect changemust be known. Preliminary evidence suggests possible roles for
reasoning biases, hallucinations, and self-esteem (Ben-Zeev, Morris, Swendsen, &
Granholm, 2011; Bortolon et al., 2019; Garety et al., 2012) but our understanding of
the factorsmaintaining grandiose delusions is currently very limited.We thereforewanted
to generate hypotheses for maintenance factors directly from patient reports. Finally,
grandiose delusions increase the risk of a patient being unmotivated to engage in standard
treatment (Mulder, Koopmans, & Hengeveld, 2005) but little is known about why this is.
Patients may feel that treatments are irrelevant or unhelpful, and such perspectives must
be understood in order for an acceptable intervention to be developed. We therefore
wanted to learn from patients what they would, and would not, want from clinical
services.
Methods
The study was approved by the NHS Health Research Authority (REC reference: 17/SC/
0515).
Research team
The studywas designed and conducted by a teamwith a range of expertise. This included
those with personal experience of grandiose delusions, as well as experts in the
development and delivery of psychological models and treatments for psychotic
experiences, and in qualitative methodology. This ensured that multiple perspectives
were obtained at all stages of the research process, which was invaluable in maximizing
the credibility and dependability (or validity and reliability) of the study (Guest,
MacQueen, & Namey, 2012a).
Participants
Participants were sought from clinical teams in Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust.
Inclusion criteria were as follows: aged 16+ years; current/past experience of grandiose
delusions held for at least 1 monthwith at least 50% conviction; and a primary diagnosis of
schizophrenia-spectrum psychosis or bipolar affective disorder. Individuals without
capacity to consent, with insufficient comprehension of English, or with primary
diagnoses of drug/alcohol/personality disorder, learning disability, or organic syndrome
were excluded. Potential participants were identified by their clinical teams and, if
consent was given to do so, approached by the lead author who provided information
about the study and screened for suitability. The Schedules for Clinical Assessment in
Neuropsychiatry (Wing et al., 1990) (items 19.029 delusions of grandiose abilities and
19.030 delusions of grandiose identity) was used to assess grandiose delusions. All
participants gave written informed consent.
Purposive sampling
Representation across those with (1) current and past grandiose delusions, and (2)
affective and non-affective diagnoses, was prioritized (Richie, Lewis, & Elam, 2014). This
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was due to anticipated differences in views on harm, treatment, andmaintenance factors.
Some harms (such as social embarrassment) were anticipated as being potentially more
apparent to those with past beliefs, whereas some maintenance factors might be more
readily identified in those currently holding a grandiose delusion. Ensuring participants
with affective and non-affective diagnoses were included allowed us to consider these
experiences bothwithin and outside of the context ofmania. Variation across gender, age,
and service experience was also sought where possible.
Data saturation
Data saturation was considered to have been achieved when no new themes emerged
from additional interviews (Fusch & Ness, 2015). In practice, it was felt that this had
occurred by the thirteenthparticipant but a further twoparticipantswere recruited to test
and confirm this. This resulted in a final sample of 15 participants. Sample extraction
details (Figure 1) and participant characteristics (Tables 1 and 2) are provided.
Procedure
Interview guide evolution
Consensus meetings and pilot interviews (conducted with those who had personal
experience of grandiose delusions) facilitated the development of a preliminary interview
guide. Decisions made at this stage included starting the interview with an open
unstructured question inviting participants to tell their story about their experience of the
identified belief. This ensured that the participant could talk about the issues most
important to them. It was also decided to have two versions of the interview questions to
ensure that experiences related to both past and current beliefs could be discussed
sensitively (e.g., asking ‘How did you come to believe you were God?’ or ‘How did you
come to realise that you were God?’). Emergent themes were incorporated into the
Figure 1. Sample extraction. *NB: A heterogeneous sample was pursued by purposive sampling to
include those with current and past grandiose delusions, and affective and non-affective diagnoses.
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Table 1. Sample characteristics (n = 15)
Demographic characteristic Frequency
Age (years)
16–25 2
26–35 3
36–45 5
46–55 1
56–65 4
Gender
Male 7
Female 8
Ethnicity
White British 12
Indian 1
Black British Caribbean 1
Mixed White and Black British 1
Marital status
Single 8
Engaged 1
Married 3
Divorced 3
Employment
Employed full time 1
Employed part time 2
Student and part-time employment 1
Unemployed 11
Diagnoses
Schizophrenia 4
Schizoaffective disorder 4
Bipolar affective disorder 6
Non-organic psychotic disorder (working diagnosis due to first presentation) 1
Current/past grandiose belief
Current belief about current abilities/identity 8
Current belief about past abilities (doesn’t believe currently has abilities) 2
Past belief not currently subscribed to 5
Service context at the time of interview
Community mental health team (CMHT) 11a
Early intervention in psychosis (EIP) team 2
Acute psychiatric inpatient setting 2
Experience of psychiatric admission
At least one psychiatric admission 13
No 2
Self-reported experience of any talking therapy (not necessarily for grandiose belief)
No 4
Yes (incl. GP counselling, individual psychotherapy or counselling (private),
individual CBT (NHS), mindfulness group therapy (NHS), ward-based
psychosis group (NHS))
11
Note. Demographic details were provided by participants except for diagnosis and service context
(identified at point of referral).
aOne participant was open to CMHT at the time of interview but had been discharged from hospital the
previous day.
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Table 2. Content of grandiose beliefs discussed during interview
Pseudonym
Marital
status Employment Diagnosis
Current
service
Past or
current
belief Belief(s)
Bob Single Student and
Employed-PT
BD EIP Past I have the capacity to become the next Messiah and am on a special
pathway towards achieving this.
Mark Divorced Unemployed SzA AMHTa Current I am working undercover for the security services.
Mandy Married Unemployed SzA AMHT Current I am a Goddess and the daughter of God with whom I have a special
relationship. In the next world, I will be married to Jesus, will have
special powers to help people, and will bring peace to the world.
Kit Single Employed-PT BD Inpatient Current I am Jesus. I am the one son of God. I have special spiritual and
mystical abilities which allow me to get very close to God and to
make the world more peaceful. (At times, I also wonder if I can
walk on water or float but am less certain about this.)
Annabelle Single Unemployed SzA AMHT Past I have been chosen byGod to be the only one he speaks to because I
am special, his favourite, and his daughter. Peoplewill build temples
dedicated to me.
Sophie Engaged Employed-PT BD EIP Past I am God. I have the power to walk on water and bless people. I will
save the world.
Stephen Single Unemployed S AMHT Current
(regarding
past abilities)
I have special powers (to read minds, levitate objects, and travel
through time). I am God. I have slept with billions of women and
fathered children by them. I created and starred in the Avengers
(who are real).
Max Single SzA AMHT Past I am on an MI7 training programme; I am in the SAS; I am 007.
Sonja Married Unemployed BD AMHT Current I have special abilities to access and transfer information via
telepathy (including with the spiritual realm). I can read others’
minds extremely quickly (much more quickly than others.)
Jessica Divorced Unemployed BD AMHT Current
(regarding
past abilities)
I am able to do telepathy. I have special knowledge (the ability to
predict the future) and abilities (knowing codes to enter and exit
locked buildings). I am on a special mission of great importance.
Continued
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Table 2. (Continued)
Pseudonym
Marital
status Employment Diagnosis
Current
service
Past or
current
belief Belief(s)
Fred Single Unemployed S AMHT Current I am a messiah, God-like figure for the world. I have superior
consciousness compared to other people.
Sarah Divorced Unemployed S Inpatient Current I receive visions from God which allow me to predict the future.
God has given me this ability because I am the Holy Spirit and his
representative on earth. God kills those who harm me because I
am special.
Brian Single Unemployed Non-organic
psychotic
disorder
EIP Current I am the reincarnation of Albert Einstein and have advanced
mathematical abilities.
Polly Single Unemployed S AMHT Current I have been chosen byGod to have a special role in saving theworld. I
will do this by marrying a person identified to me by God (either a
current friend, or Jesus himself).
Mildred Married Employed-FT BD AMHT Past I have special powers to predict the future; I have been chosen by
God to save the world from evil forces because I am special.
Note. AMHT = Adult Mental Health Team; BD = bipolar affective disorder; EIP = early intervention for psychosis service; FT = full-time; PT = part-time;
S = schizophrenia; SzA = schizoaffective disorder.
aOne participant was open to AMHT at the time of interview but had been recruited during his admission to hospital, and the interview took place 1 day after
discharge.
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interview guide as they arose. For example, after the first five interviews, it became
apparent that the experience of grandiose beliefs was not synonymous with feelings of
superiority or arrogance and therefore an additional question was added to elicit
additional information about this (Question: ‘I’m interested in how this experience
impacts on your view of yourself in relation to others. Do you see yourself as different or
the same as others?’ If difference was suggested, optional further probes included: ‘How
are you different? Is this in a good way or a negative way? Do you see yourself as better or
worse than others? Or superior or inferior to others?’).
Interview process
Semi-structured, in-depth, audio-recorded interviews were conducted by the lead author
in accordance with relevant guidelines (Byrne, 2011; Yeo et al., 2014). They were open-
ended (59–187 min). After the initial open question, subsequent focused questions
facilitated discussion about belief onset, possible maintenance factors, impact on the
individual, and experiences of mental health services. Follow-up questions and probes
were used as appropriate. Interviews were transcribed, anonymized, checked for
accuracy, and offered to participants for review (Bazeley, 2013; Poland, 1995).
Almost all participantswere unknown to the interviewer (a clinical psychologist in the
Trust) before the study. One participant had completed a course of therapy with the
interviewer 2 years prior to the present study. Where possible, steps were taken to
minimize potential power imbalances between the interviewer and the participants
(Gilburt, Rose, & Slade, 2008; Hoffmann, 2007). These included the interviewer
emphasizing their viewpoint that the participant’s perspective was paramount and that
our intention was to learn from them. Care was also taken to schedule the interview at a
time and location of the participant’s choice and to remind participants that they could
choose not to answer questions. It was also emphasized that information given by the
participant in the interview would only be shared with care teams in the presence of
significant risk.
Method of analysis
Transcribed data were read and re-read to ensure familiarity with the data. All interviews
were coded by the lead author, however in line with recommendations (Barbour, 2001),
multiple coding for a number of interviews, team reviews of the coding framework, and
regular team consultation, including where uncertainty arose during coding, aimed to
increase reliability.
Two early transcripts were considered in their entirety by two members of the
research team (LI and LG) who each independently recorded ideas for possible codes
before discussing. Suggested codeswere further discussedwith a third teammember (DF)
who had also reviewed these early transcripts. A preliminary coding framework which
therefore incorporated multiple perspectives on the data was subsequently agreed. This
framework largely corresponded to overarching topics on the interview guide but
evolved in line with emerging ideas.
Details regarding each code (including the specific data and coder it had originated
from, and whether it was an a priori or ‘in vivo’ code) were recorded, using memos in
Nvivo, to form a codebook. The coding frameworkwas regularly reviewedby the research
team and adjusted accordingly. For example, after coding of the first five transcripts, the
coding framework for the potential maintenance mechanisms of grandiose beliefs was
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very ‘fine-grained’, with 62 different codes. Team discussion regarding the relative costs
and benefits of broad (‘lumping’) versus fine-grained (‘splitting’) coding (Guest,
MacQueen, & Namey, 2012b; Weller & Romney, 1988) yielded a refined framework (30
codes), where codes that turned out to be similar weremerged together. For example, the
code ‘positive impact of the grandiose belief on beliefs about the self’ initially had 11
associated sub-codes describing different sub-categories (e.g., ‘it makesme normal’, ‘I will
have a better job than before’). In the revised framework, the sub-codes were dropped,
and their associated data subsumed into the broader code.Details of the original sub-codes
were recorded in the codebook, however, so that ideas were not lost and could be
considered during analysis. Other coding reviews found that the codes ‘rang true’ with
teammembers’ own experiences of grandiose beliefs, who felt key informationwas being
captured helpfully within the framework.
In addition to the first two interviews being double-coded (as described earlier),
coding of an early interview was reviewed in its entirety by an additional coder (BS) to
increase reliability. This yielded additional codes such as ‘behavioural enaction’
(capturing behaviours resulting from the grandiose belief) that were incorporated into
the coding framework. An iterative approach was adopted in the coding phase. As the
coding framework evolved, earlier interviews were reviewed to ensure information
relevant to emerging codes was captured. For example, the ‘behavioural enaction’ code
was added after the first five interviews had been coded and therefore these interviews
were reviewed again to ensure that pertinent data from these transcripts was captured.
After all interviews were completed, ‘coding checks’ of each transcript were conducted.
This involved the primary coder reviewing their initial codes with ‘fresh eyes’ after a
period of time which has been recommended as a strategy to mitigate against ‘distorting
effects immersion in the data can cause’ (Guest et al., 2012a).
Interviews were explored using inductive and deductive thematic analysis (Braun &
Clarke, 2006), and drawing on grounded theory whereby the detailed investigation of
initially unstructured narratives was compared to the research question under investi-
gation. This offered a high degree of flexibility and fidelity to the data. As indicated, this
approach generated initial codes, which were constantly compared and modified as new
interviews were added and analysed. This allowed for the initial formation of conceptual
themes which were constantly re-examined by the addition of new data in a dialectical
process (Hutchison, Johnston, & Breckon, 2010). NVivo version 12 was used to support
the coding, organization, and analysis of data.
Results
Harm
Interviewer: ‘I wondered whether you’d be able to tell your story [. . .] of your experience of
being Jesus?’
Kit: ‘Well, first off, it’s ten years of being sad’.
Harmful or potentially harmful situations were identified by all participants and had
arisen inmultiple life domains as a direct consequence of their grandiose beliefs. Trying to
fly or walk on water (physical harm), going home with strangers they believed to be God
(sexual harm), being rejected or ridiculed by others for their beliefs or associated
behaviours (social harm), dropping out of university because of preoccupation with
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Box 1: Further examples of harm across domains
Physical harm
Sophie: “In some cases I wouldn’t think through where I tried [walking on water]. So maybe it
will incidentally be shallow [. . .] but also in deeper places, and [. . .] places where getting out
might have been challenging”; “It could’ve gone very very wrong if things had been slightly
different [. . .]. I could’ve got seriously hurt.”
Sophie: “Trying to fly off various heighted objects”; “[I] stepped off things and expected to fly.”
Interviewer: “What’s the highest thing you’ve stepped off?” Sophie: [deep exhale, 10s pause]“I
can’t entirely remember. And I don’t want to remember if that makes sense.”
Max (describing an altercation at a nightclubwhilst believing he had secret services training
and protection from ‘other’ officers): “Normally I would’ve just left it but [. . .] because I felt that
I was in some sort of training scheme, some organisation I felt a lot more confident so that added
to the conflict. [. . .] I felt that people were looking out for me.”
Jessica: “I was on a mission [. . .] I walked across fields, I took my shoes off and put them as
markers [. . .]. I endedupwalking, I’ve never seen it before but therewas a caravan and I knocked
on the caravan and this man was startled, as youwould be at 11, 10 at night. But he wouldn’t let
me in. And it was absolutely chucking it down, and maybe I wouldn’t, but bearing in mind I’ve
got not shoes and socks.”
Brian (talking about being Einstein): “I needed to get to the highest point, so I could see, like,
the horizon line [. . .]. And that’s when they sectioned me because they thought I was going to
commit suicide because Iwas over like loads of electricwires [. . .]. I was on the lamppost on the
bridge, sitting on top of it. [. . .] I just wanted to see the horizon line. I was literally just obsessed
with space and that.”
Sexual harm
Kit: “I have met with my Father [God] twice in human form. [. . .] first one was Arthur* and
Arthur* was a bit confusing [. . .]. What he does he tries to give me like life lessons [. . .] but then
he also wanked off to gay porn when I was in the room and I felt a bit violated.”
Polly’s description of sexual harm is presented in the text. The example given however was not
an isolated incident and Polly described several similar occurrences including one when she
ended up spending the night on the streets with a homeless man who she described as being
high on narcotics.
Social harm
Stephen: “I was talking to her, I was gonna offer her a drink, and this other girl pulled her away
and said ‘ I just thought I would pull you away from that situation’ [. . .]” Interviewer: “Why do
you think she did that?” Stephen: “I don’t know. It’s just what people think I am isn’t it [. . .].
People think I’m a weirdo. Some people think I’m not right in the head.”
Mildred (describing a previous boyfriend ending their relationship when she believed she
was in a battle of good vs. evil with one of his relatives): “Hewas just like, ‘I can’t. . . I just can’t
do this anymore.’” Interviewer: "And what impact did that have on you at the time?" Mildred:
"Erm. . .. my world fell to pieces."
Emotional harm
Fred (describing feeling different to others as a Messiah): “In my 30s I wanted to die; I wanted
to commit suicide [. . .] For anyone in that position I thought it would be ordinary to commit
suicide, it was just hopeless”; “I was certainly depressed for a long time, and I came to this
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experiences (occupational harm), and feeling depressed, frightened, angry, under
pressure, and suicidal (emotional harm) were all described (Box 1 provides additional
quotes).
Harmwas sometimes the direct consequence of the participant’s behaviour (Jessica: ‘I
drove faster than I normally would’) but frequently the risk came from others. Some,
especially the male participants, knowingly entered dangerous situations feeling
themselves to be invulnerable (Max described confidence during an altercation at a
nightclub because ‘I felt that people were looking out for me’). Others demonstrated a
lack of awareness of the risks posed by others:
Polly: ‘This elderly gentleman cameup tome [. . .]. I thought “you’reGod”. Iwent to his house
[. . .]. We had some kisses and cuddles and I said “canwe bemarried?”. He said “no”. [. . .] “we
can be partners” and from that I thought hemeant not literally romantic partners but business
partners; partners in the process of saving people’.
Often the participant was adversely affected but there were examples of significant
harm to others, with evidence of family, friends, and strangers experiencing distress,
neglect, embarrassment, or fear:
Max: ‘I saw two guys [. . .] and said “stop, I want to speak to you”. [. . .] [They] startedwalking
away. I don’t know if theywere doing something dodg-, but then I openedmy jacket andwent
like [motions reaching inside inner jacket pocket]. They started running [. . .]. I said “stop
armed police!” or something and they just ran off’.
Sarah: ‘I was going to heaven, [. . .] spending timewith God [. . .]. Always in visions [dreams].
My dayswould beperfectly normal, butmynightswould be justmagical. And this iswherewe
get tomy daughter because. . . I just wanted to go to bed. Shewas a teenager andwanted to be
outwith her friends and Iwould just ignore her. Go to sleep and leave her. I didn’t even know
what time shewas coming in. [. . .] It did impact our relationship. [. . .] I would go to bed early
[. . .]. say seven o’clock, [. . .] because that was more exciting than my daily life and I didn’t
realise that I neglected her’.
Harmswere evident bothwhen the beliefwas present but also afterwards. Participants
recalled feeling embarrassment or a sense of loss once the belief receded (Max: ‘you slip
into quite a deep depression after you realise [. . .] it’s not like you go from a feeling of
being really important back to where you were before, you go from really important to
really unimportant’.). Others described encountering practical difficulties, such as Sophie
who described the impact of taking time off work due to a hospital admission that was
directly related to her belief:
momentous decision, ‘oh, to hell with it all, I’m not playing this game of being a human being
anymore’.”
Jessica: “There were fireworks going off but to me they weren’t fireworks, they were gunshot
rings and I remember, although I was scared and that, I was on a mission, I had to do it.”
Bob: “The messiah is completely devoid off all sin [. . .]. So I would not allow myself [. . .] to feel
any greed, [. . .], any sort of desire, without feeling guilt for it, without feeling self-hatred.”
*pseudonym.
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Sophie: ‘It’s practically hugely damaging. Seven weeks off work – big problem. After seven
weeks I missed out on the chance to do my [job specific] certificate [. . .]. I was just getting
the management to agree to support me, getting mymentor, I’d done all the work, they just
needed to sign it off, and then I was in [hospital city] for seven weeks. [. . .] Actually no [. . .]
there’s like a three, four week gap, then another five weeks where I’m not working, then
two or three weeks of day hospital afterwards. Suddenly it’s been that long, you go back [to
work] but not all the same staff are there, it was a different manager. I was no longer so
regular and valued that theywanted to do it, and I was still impaired. I don’t knowwhy I was
still impaired, I don’t know why everything’s harder but after that everything was so much
harder’.
Harm was not solely caused by the belief per se, but sometimes due to the degree of
preoccupation with it (Mandy described accidentally scalding herself whilst caught up
thinking about the belief) or by others’ responses:
Mandy: ‘My brother’s partner said “can Mandy come up?” and- . . .I was very upset once
because my cousin said “No. I can’t cope with what she’s saying [about being the Goddess],
it’s stressful for me [. . .]”. So I couldn’t sometimes go up’.
Disbelief by others was prominent and experienced negatively by most participants,
especially those currently hospitalized:
Kit: ‘I was going to kill myself on New Year’s Eve [. . .] It was linked to breaking up with my
girlfriend and ten years of just people ignoring me [Jesus] [. . ..], I even went to the Evensong,
you know, in a church, stood next to everyone, they were all singing to Jesus, and no one
fucking talked to me. No one really does want me [Jesus] because, you know, it lasts a lot
longer if I’m just dead and people just don’t know’.
Maintenance mechanisms
Six potential psychological maintenance factors were identified. Box 2 provides further
illustrative quotes.
Meaning-making
All narratives emphasized that grandiose beliefs were ‘meaning-making’ experiences.
Participants reported the beliefs as highly significant and they appeared to provide a
sense of purpose, belonging, or self-identity, or make sense of unusual or difficult
events.
The types of meaning inherent in the belief differed between participants. Power
and self-efficacy, helping others, and making a valuable contribution to society were
common themes. Social meanings were also prevalent and participants described
that they were (or would be) ‘part of a team’, respected by others, or involved in
intimate relationships with the promise of comfort, protection, marriage, sex, or
children.
Frequently grandiose beliefs occurred in the face of negative circumstances and, as
such, appeared to be protective. Accounts of the belief providing respite from paranoia,
lowmood, self-loathing, and rejection, and as a means to make sense of suffering, achieve
retribution for past wrongs, and retain hope for a better future were all described.
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Box 2: Illustrations of possible maintenance mechanisms and service-
related experiences
Meaning-making experiences
Helping others andhope for the future:Mandy: “I was tellingme parents I could help ‘em
[. . .]. They’re suffering now but it will come out alright.”; “[God] says ‘hang on in there’ [. . .] I
know you suffer sometimes but suffering’s for a reason, and you will come out of it.’"
Power and achieving potential: Max: “[It made] me feel strong and powerful and sort of
able to do anything. The sort of feeling you get, it makes you feel like you become the person
you’ve always wanted to be or better.”
Being useful and helping society: Mark: “I feel I am useful to society.”
Socialmeaning: Stephen: “I just feel part of a team”;Mandy: “I’m gonna have children in the
new life.”
Anomalous experiences
Anomalous experiences powerful and intense, increasing sense of their signifi-
cance:Kit: “The actual powerful voice of God spoke tome and said ‘Do it right this time.’ I fell
into a bush [. . .] like it came out of kind of sunlight clouds which was on the righthand side of
me. And it was so powerful I fell over.”
Anomalous experiences being sought due to their meaning in the context of the
grandiose belief: Kit: “God reveals himself to people in dreams. So my dreams have always
been themost interesting thing that I spend a lot of time asleep dreaming and I force myself to
sleep to dream because God shows himself in that way.”
Mania
Mania preceding development of grandiose belief:Mildred: “For that particular episode,
[. . .] I know exactly where the trigger came from. My mood had started to go up and I was
reading these books[. . .] I think Imanaged to get through all tenwithin about twoweeks. [. . .] I
was sleeping less than I normally do, but [. . .] I wasn’t worried about it. [. . .] I think my mood
went up before the sleep reduced”.
The grandiose belief changingwhen themania recedes:Mildred: “I think I just came out
ofmy episode, basically. I think natural. . . I go up and down. I literally naturally cameout of the
other side and my focus just ever so slightly shifted”.
Fantasy elaboration
Thinking about the belief (in imagery form) feels good:Mandy: “Well it can feel good,
yeah, looking like that [giggles]. I could see err-, see myself, err the eyes they are not just err. . .
they’re like that! [gesturing large eyes]”.
Reasoning biases
Confirmation bias:Bob: “I had the ideas. . .. It became a reciprocating system in that I would
then feel this reinforcement with this information stream. [. . .] As my perception would
change, the information stream would change. In much the same way, if you are ice skating
and you start looking one way you will start drifting that way.”
“There was a pathway which I followed of my own logic, which was potentially fallible [. . .].
But I didn’t take the time to try to fail myself [. . .] because failing myself would mean the past
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Bob: ‘I hated who I was.’; ‘I tried to seek some sort of route to escape this depression, which
was to again fall into this fantasy world in which I would try to elevate myself, and you can
elevate yourself as far as you want in your own fantasy, you can be the next messiah [. . .].’
Such a ‘meaning-making’ function could lead to belief persistence:
Bob: ‘[I] wanted the fantasy to persist, [. . .] I wanted to beMessiah, I wanted to be important’;
‘I wasn’t looking for information against it because I didn’t want it to be false’.
The inherent meaning was not typically synonymous with feeling highly superior,
arrogant, or overly entitled. When superiority was evident, it was often not totally
unwarranted (e.g., the participant having above average intelligence), or it was
accompanied by humility or uncertainty:
Fred: ‘I feel superior to other people, definitely, yes. I don’t go around saying that, [. . .] but
that’s how I feel inside’.
Interviewer: ‘Having these abilities, do you see yourself as different to others in someway, or
the same, or. . .?’ Jessica: ‘No, no. No, not at all.’; Interviewer: ‘Sowhen you felt youwere on a
mission, [. . .] in that moment have you felt better or worse than others, or superior or inferior
to others? [. . .]’ Jessica: ‘No. Probably the same’.
fewmonths I had donehadgone towaste and I’d destroyedmyself and thewhole post negative
implications which I did not want to face.”
Negative social information being misinterpreted positively: Polly: “An elderly
gentleman [. . .] walked past me [. . .]. I thought ‘he looks like God’. [. . .] I said, ‘Hello,
Daddy’, and he said something like ‘what do youwant?’ [hostile tone]. I said, ‘What can I do to
please you?’ [. . .] He said, ‘Nothing.’ I said, “What can I do for you?” And he said, ‘nothing!’”
Interviewer: “What was that like?” Polly: “Well, it was nice to meet him.” Interviewer: “When
he said, ‘there’s nothing’, what did you take from that?” Polly: “That Jesus has done it all, we
don’t have to”.
Advice/feedback from others rejected: Bob: “Anyone who tried to come and sort of say
‘No, sorry your reality’s false, you are completely psychotic’ had no effect onme, except just to
sort of aggravate. . . umm. . . and to push me further away.”
Immersive behaviours
Sophie: “I was completely convinced Iwas God. I needed to go out and bless via libraries.Why
libraries I don’t know, but Iwas convinced that librarieswere an effectiveway to bless andwas
just going around. . . yeah.”
Service-experience
Positive techniquesused tohelpmanage thegrandiosedelusion:Participant: “myCPN
was amazing [. . .] thinking about thinking patterns and cycles of behaviour [. . .] ways to
challenge it, looking a bit at the evidence and like noticing reinforcing patterns.”
Participant: “If you want to approach this problem for grandiosity [. . .] you need to approach
many other things in life. You may find that [. . .] you still have that grandiosity at the end of it,
but it wouldn’t be a problem. [. . .] It’s more about making a person a more well-rounded
individual. The problem isn’t grandiosity, the problem is how they view themselves, how they
interact with the world.”
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Interviewer: ‘Does [being the Goddess] make you feel better than other people?’ Mandy: ‘No
no. ‘Cause we all come from-. In fact they-, everybody comes from me in the first place, flesh
was took away fromme, but umm. . .no no. I would be over [them] in away, but no, all people
are people. They should all be treated the same’.
Polly: ‘I know I’m not better than anybody else. . ., but it does make me feel special’. [. . .].
Interviewer: ‘Doyou feel superior to others?’ Polly: ‘I do but that’s rubbish, I shouldn’t feel like
that’.
Anomalous experiences
Anomalous experiences (AEs) were described by all but one participant. Most common
were auditory hallucinations (reported by eight participants) and a felt sense of salience
(reported by six participants) but other hallucinations (somatic, olfactory and visual),
dissociative experiences (out of body experiences and deja vu), and vivid dreams were
also evident.
Anomalous experiences were implicated in belief maintenance in several ways. First,
the content of the AE could cause or confirm the belief. Mandy described realizing shewas
the Goddess when ‘He [God] was in my head and telling me.’; ‘A voice was telling me’.
Similarly, Sophie described a referential belief (‘the sunset told me stuff, it had meaning’),
underpinned by a felt sense of salience, which fed into her belief about having special
abilities. The presence of an AE was often described as the defining moment at which the
person ‘knew’ their belief was true, and some indicated that the belief receded when the
AEs did.
Anomalous experiences were described as powerful and intense, making them
potentially more likely to be appraised as significant. For some, the grandiose belief was
the most plausible explanation for AEs that felt strange and profound:
Fred: ‘I had an immense shift of consciousness, rather like suddenly being able to see, whereas
previously I couldn’t see.’; ‘I felt that somethingmomentoushadhappened [. . .] I attributed it to
being the second coming of Christ, because that was the only framework that I had to put it in’.
A reciprocal relationship was also evident with some participants deliberately seeking
out AEs because they were seen as important or pleasurable in the context of the
grandiose belief (Kit, Sarah).
Mania
Where grandiose beliefs co-occurred with mania, interactions were sometimes
apparent. Max said ‘[The grandiose beliefs] have always been after elevated mood.’,
and ‘It’s a really good feeling, feeling that you’re in the SAS’ suggesting a bi-directional
interaction with elevated mood. Brian described racing thoughts (‘the numbers started
coming really fast’) contributing to his realization that hewas Einstein reincarnated, and
several participants described sleep disturbance preceding or accompanying their
grandiose beliefs.
Mania was not a necessary condition for the maintenance of grandiose delusions,
however, and several participants (including those with affective diagnoses) presented at
interview with current grandiose beliefs in the absence of elevated mood/mania. Mildred
noted that of two occasions when she believed she was chosen by God to battle evil, one
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was clearly preceded by ‘mania’ (elevated mood, poor sleep, increased energy) and
resolved when she ‘came out of my episode’ but that mania was not present on the other
occasion:
‘I don’t know what triggered that, only that my Dad had left, [. . .] my Mum had a nervous
breakdown, so Iwas left in charge ofmy two younger sisters’; ‘I suppose it was obviously very
heightened emotionally, so it must have. . . it can only have come from that, but I don’t
remember having a particularly highmood’; ‘[the other experience] was different. There was
a lot of energy behind that that there wasn’t with this’.
Fantasy elaboration
Participants described thinking about their grandiose beliefs ‘all the time’ (Mark; Polly),
that ‘it took overmywhole life’ (Brian), and that itwas onlypossible to stop thinking about
them when significantly distracted (e.g., helping someone in trouble (Bob) or starting a
newcompany (Mildred)). Such thoughtswere not always verbal; compelling imageswere
also present:
Mandy (describing an image of being the Goddess): ‘I’m blonde hair, big brown eyes, and
they’re massive [. . .]. I felt these huge eyes and long blonde hair, and then a figure’.
Whilstwe anticipated that repetitive thinkingwould occur because itwas pleasurable,
the wider meaning, which typically went beyond simple hedonic pleasure, also drove
repetitive thinking:
Mark: ‘It fills my time. I’m always busy [. . .]. In the past without doing that I’d be just feeling
bored, sitting in my flat, listening to the radio, watching TV, sitting on my computer, bored,
drinking alcohol. [. . .]. But with this situation I am busy thinking all the time’.
Reasoning biases
Participants’ descriptions were consistent with a range of biases being present, most
commonly confirmation bias:
Interviewer: ‘If someone had said “we don’t think that is happening” [. . .] how would you
have reacted?’Mildred: ‘Well. . .. That [would be] just another sign than I’m on the right path.
That’s a test’.
Jumping to conclusions (an absence of data-gathering) also occurred:
Max: ‘I spent a lot of time thinking about it, not that much time like researching about it. Just
thinking, thinking about it and feeling I would get the right answers myself without actually
looking it up’.
Negative social information was misinterpreted as positive, and there were descrip-
tions of discrediting advice or feedback:
Stephen: ‘People just kept staring at me wherever I went [. . .]’. Interviewer: ‘What did you
conclude from that?’ Stephen: ‘That I was something powerful’.
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Interviewer: ‘When you’re in that mode of being God, how do you respond to advice or
feedback from others?’ Sophie: ‘Completely dismiss and ignore it’.
Although reasoning biases were frequently evident, there were counter-examples
including altering belief conviction with disconfirmatory evidence:
Max: ‘I was convinced that I was in the SAS [. . .], I thought the police were gonna raid the
place and get me out. And obviously that didn’t happen, so I think when I came out I felt a bit
less convinced’.
Immersion behaviours
Participants described behaviourswhere they immersed themselves in aworld consistent
with the delusion. This included acting according to their perceived role or identity
(Sophie: ‘I was God. I needed to go out blessing’; Max: ‘I was in the SAS [. . .] I was sort of
patrolling the town’), or withdrawing and becoming engrossed in information that fitted
with their belief (Bob: ‘I shut myself off from the world [. . .] I was sort of in my brain with
videos online, articles, and on the internet there’s no filter, you can literally get anything. I
was [. . .] trying to get in touch with what I thought reality was’).
Participants described engaging in these ‘immersion behaviours’ for several reasons.
Some wanted information to understand how to achieve their ‘mission’ or evidence to
prove to themselves or others that their belief was true. Others acted because it felt good
or important. Sophie described trying to walk on water with differing rationales. When
uncertain if she was a demi-God, she ‘did some experiments to test [it] out’, but when she
‘knew’ she could do it she acted because ‘it could be fun’.
Experience of service-use and help-seeking
Participant: ‘Nobody talked to me. I wanted to talk to them [. . .] I was alone and isolated’.
Participants unanimously reported difficulty talking to mental health services about
their experience of grandiose delusions, despite the majority thinking that it might be
helpful. Experienceswere reported as hard to articulate (Fred: ‘it’s very hard to [. . .] know
what to say to describe it’) or secrecy was inherent in the belief (Max: ‘I won’t speak to
them about it, thinking it’s something that needs to be kept secret’). The lack of discussion
was primarily attributed to staff- or service-related factors. Staff not knowing how to talk
about grandiose beliefs, speaking to familymembers rather than the participant, or simply
not listening or understanding were described. Insufficient time in appointments or
previous aversive experiences (e.g., compulsory admission, or feeling ‘browbeaten’,
‘ignored’, or ‘dismissed’) were further barriers to opening up:
Participant: ‘You tell care staff, themedical staff and then they say, “right, you have to go into
hospital” and “we’re taking your driving licence away”’.
Talking about the grandiose belief was considered important to enable risk
monitoring, facilitate belief change, or offer support:
Understanding grandiose delusions 17
Participant: ‘Even if you can’t change my beliefs I really appreciate being listened to and
talked to ‘cause it’s really upsetting [. . .]. You can do that human support even if you can’t
change the situation’.
In terms of what would be helpful, taking time to develop trust was repeatedly
reiterated. Other recommendations included asking specifically about the experiences
(without being pushy) and listening carefully to the participant’s perspective:
Participant: ‘If people don’t take the time to get to know, and don’t ask questions [. . .] it’s a
big problem. Because if I’m having these ideas I think it’s obvious. [. . .] It’s quite unhelpful
whenpeople assume you’ll tell them stuff. [. . .] So actually try to talk about it and interactwith
it, rather than just assuming you’ll tell people everything.’
Participants particularly appreciated staff who had ‘gone the extra mile’ (e.g., buying
the participant a coffee or taking extra time to talk when distressed).
Few participants had been offered therapy for their grandiose beliefs. Unhelpful
experiences of therapy more generally included too great a focus on the past or the
participant feeling blamed (‘[it’s] your thought processes that were wrong, [. . .] there’s
something wrong in you’). However, descriptions of helpful therapy experiences
suggested that looking at evidence for and against the belief, considering alternative
explanations, and looking at aspects identified as possible maintenance cycles may be
beneficial:
Bob: ‘[Good therapywould be] something that makes them feel good, [. . .] makes themwant
to be in reality. Getting up every day, going for a morning run, having some good breakfast
[. . .] having projects to work on, having skills you learn. [. . .] What’s your lovelife like?[. . .]
You need to look at all aspects of the person’s life.’; ‘You’ve also got to have a sense of
belonging [. . .] a place within your society, a sense you have some worth’.
Discussion
This is the first qualitative study focussed upon the experience of grandiose delusions. The
patient accountswere extraordinarily rich,withmost participants never having spoken in
depth before about these experiences. Harm from grandiose delusions – across multiple
domains –was evident for all the participants, and occurred as a direct consequence of the
belief, from preoccupation, and from the responses of others. The limited literature on
harm associated with grandiose delusions focuses almost exclusively on offending (van
Dongen, Buck, & Van Marle, 2015; Ullrich, Keers, & Coid, 2014) but clearly a wider
perspective is needed.
A number of potential maintenance factors were identified (see Figure 2). Foremost,
the beliefs provided a sense of purpose, belonging, or positive identity, often in difficult
circumstances, creating a motivation for belief retention. Second, grandiose beliefs
offered a plausible explanation for anomalous experiences, which, in some cases,
resulted in these experiences being actively sought. Third, a mood-elevating bi-
directional relationship between symptoms of mania and grandiosity appeared to occur
for some patients. Fourth, positive rumination or ‘fantasy elaboration’ may act in a way
akin to that of worry in persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2015), whereby
repetitively thinking (or having imagery) about the belief brings it to mind, elaborates
details, and increases conviction. Fifth, reasoning biases were also prominent,
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consistent with evidence that they are heightened in grandiose delusions (Garety et al.,
2012). Negative social feedback appeared to be disregarded or interpreted in an overly
positive manner, similar to findings in hypomania (Devlin, Zaki, Ong, & Gruber, 2015;
Mansell & Lam, 2006). Finally, immersive behaviours reinforced the belief. Memories for
self-performed actions may be stronger compared to imagined actions (Engelkamp,
1989), so that ‘being in role’ may provide particularly accessible or compelling
memories.
These findings from patient interviews were consistent with hypotheses considered
by other researchers who have suggested that grandiose beliefs may compensate for
negative self-beliefs (Beck & Rector, 2005; Ben-Zeev et al., 2011; Knowles et al., 2011;
Smith, Freeman, & Kuipers, 2005), and be associated with anomalous experiences
(Bortolon et al., 2019; Knowles et al., 2011), reasoning biases (Garety et al., 2012;
Knowles et al., 2011), and repetitive, imagery-based thinking (Knowles et al., 2011).
Further research empirically testing the hypothesized maintenance model, and deter-
mining the extent towhich specificmaintenance factors are unique to delusion subtypes,
is clearly required.
The qualitative nature of our investigation enabled a hypothesizedmaintenancemodel
for grandiose delusions to be generated; however, there were some limitations.
Obviously, our findings are not representative, and we did not include those with
subclinical grandiosity or older adults, nor gain viewpoints from other key groups (e.g.,
family members or mental health professionals). The sample were predominantly White
British and although this represents the demographic structure of the capture area of the
NHS Trust in which the study took place, the transferability of the findings may therefore
be limited. There may be other potential maintenance factors that we did not identify
within this study. Additionally, althoughwe tookmultiple steps tominimize the potential
-
Figure 2. Hypothesized maintenance model of grandiose delusions. NB: Not all maintenance factors
were evident in all participants. As such, we suggest that no maintenance factor is either necessary or
sufficient for the persistence of grandiose delusions, and idiosyncratic combinations of factors will be
relevant to different individuals.
Understanding grandiose delusions 19
for bias as much as possible, our own experiences (as clinical psychologists, qualitative
methodologists, and those with personal experience of grandiose delusions), and the fact
that only a small subgroup of interviews were coded in full by multiple coders, mean that
data were viewed through a particular lens. Further research investigating different
populations and viewpoints would be of value.
Despite these limitations, such models have the potential to drive clinical interven-
tions in the future, and therewere several key implications from theparticipant interviews
that should be considered. The level of harm evident highlights the need for a targeted
treatment specifically for grandiose delusions. Patient recognition of some forms of harm
indicates a possible route for engagement, andparticipantswere largely positive about the
possibility of receivingpsychological therapy. Any decision to intervene, however, should
only be made after careful consideration of the meaning and associated benefits of the
belief. Trying to alter the belief without first compensating for the benefit or function of
the belief is likely to prove both difficult and potentially iatrogenic. Direct belief change
may not always be the most advantageous option. If harm is limited to negative responses
from others, addressing behavioural responses to the grandiose belief (e.g., discerning
who can be talked to about the experiences) and taking steps to address stigma more
broadly might be more appropriate.
Notably, grandiositywas not synonymouswith high levels of superiority, arrogance, or
entitlement. This is significant because ‘grandiose’ is often used as a derogatory term to
indicate such traits. It may be that grandiose beliefs enhance self-esteem, but do not
necessarily cause it to become excessively exaggerated. Alternatively, as suggested by one
participant, such traits, when apparent, may be more closely connected to mania. Since
actually having exceptional abilities or identity is not synonymouswith viewing oneself as
being inherently better than others, then superiority should not be assumed to occur in
the context of grandiose delusions. Consequently, we suggest that if this finding is
replicated in future studies, grandiose delusions should be better termed: ‘delusions of
exceptionality’. This may be a more accurate reflection of the experience and, as such, a
better way to think about administering care.
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